Why Our Fair Share Housing Laws Fail by Field, Ben
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 34 | Number 1 Article 2
1-1-1993
Why Our Fair Share Housing Laws Fail
Ben Field
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Ben Field, Why Our Fair Share Housing Laws Fail, 34 Santa Clara L. Rev. 35 (1993).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss1/2
WHY OUR FAIR SHARE HOUSING LAWS FAIL*
Ben Field**
It is well documented that California is facing a housing
crisis. Population growth during the 1980s far exceeded the
growth in housing supply.' High demand, resulting from
population growth and limited supply, has dramatically in-
creased home prices. However, family income has not kept
pace.2 As a result, fewer families are able to afford homes.3
The rise in the cost of rental housing has also exceeded the
increase in family income.4 Using almost any measure, hous-
ing costs in California exceed housing costs in the rest of the
country. The state hosts thirteen of the fifteen metropolitan
areas with the nation's least affordable housing. 5
* Many people contributed to this article, but four were especially
important to its progress. Although they may not entirely agree with the
article, Nancy Scott, Jerome Field, Michael Rawson, and Professor Ira Michael
Heyman each shaped and improved it.
** Ph.D. Candidate, History, University of California at Berkeley; J.D.,
Boalt Hall, 1993; B.A. (Phi Beta Kappa, Summa Cum Laude) Columbia Univer-
sity, 1986. The author joined the Santa Clara County District Attorney's Office
in January 1994.
1. California's population grew 24% during the 1980's to more than 29 mil-
lion people. Bradley Inman, Population Gains Outpace Housing, Sacramento
Bee, September 9, 1990, at I1. Housing supply grew 20% during the 1980's to
11.2 million units. Id. Based on an average household size of 2.7, this repre-
sents a shortfall of 129,621 housing units statewide. Id.
2. The median price of an existing single-family home increased 580%
from $24,300 in 1970 to 165,600 in 1988, while the median family income rose
234% from $10,828 to $36,200 during the same period. California Association
of Realtors, California's Housing Crisis: The American Dream Deferred, Policy
Recommendations for State and Local Housing Issues 10 (August, 1989) [here-
inafter Realtors].
3. Thirty to 35% of California households were renters during the 1960's,
and the rest owned their homes. By the end of the 1980's the statistics were
reversed, with the vast majority of households renting. Bradley Inman, Rental
Crunch in the State's Future, Sacramento Bee, April 21, 1991, at H1.
4. The median rent in California increased 125% from $126 in 1970 to
$283 in 1980, while median family income rose 99% from $10,828 to 21,537
during the same period. See Realtors, supra note 2.
5. Bay Area Council, Housing and Development Report: What's Wrong
With Bay Area Housing Elements (July, 1991) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Bay Area Council]. These figures are based on the percentages of households
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The shortage of affordable housing in California has a
profound effect on people living in California. The state's
population growth, coupled with the shortage of affordable
housing, has caused overcrowding in almost twenty percent
of the state's rental units.6 The shortage of affordable hous-
ing close to employment centers is forcing workers to live far-
ther and farther from their jobs.7 The resulting increase in
commuting causes traffic congestion and adverse environ-
mental impacts.8 The lack of affordable housing also places
strains on family life. "In order to locate affordable housing,
many family members are working longer hours, multiple
jobs or commuting long distances to work. All these factors
take a toll on family life, leaving less time for parents to
spend with their children and adding to the stress of an al-
ready long work day."9 The shortage of affordable housing is
at the core of complex interrelated problems.
The impact of exclusionary land use controls on the cost
and supply of housing has been well documented. 10 Accord-
able to afford a median-priced home with a mortgage of 9.25%, spending no
more than 2.8 times the household's income. Id.
6. The Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD) de-
termined that nearly 20% of the rental units in California were overcrowded in
1992. In 1982, only 10.5% of the state's rental units were overcrowded. HCD
defines "overcrowded" as "more than one person living in each bedroom."
Household size has increased from 2.67 people in 1980 to 2.8 people in 1990.
Bradley Inman, Confusion Reigns in Rental Market, Sacramento Bee, January
26, 1992, at Fl.
7. Richard T. LeGates, REGIONAL HOUSING IssUsS IN THE SAN FRANcIsCO
BAY AREA 220-22 (1990) (discussing the housing/jobs imbalance in the Bay
Area). See also Robert Cervero, Suburban Gridlock, BERKELEY U.C. PRESS,
June 15, 1986, at AL. (describing the national trend-exemplified in Califor-
nia-of increasing commute times).
8. See, e.g., LEGATES, supra note 7, at 23-28 (analyzing the problem of sub-
urban sprawl and the disappearance of open space in the Bay Area); BAY VI-
SION 2020, FINAL REPORT, 8-9 (1991) ([hereinafter BAY VISION]) (discussing the
Bay Area's air quality and water supply problems).
9. Bradley Inman, SACRAMENTO BEE, August 5, 1990 at I1.
10. For the purpose of this article, exclusionary land use controls are regu-
lations that significantly interfere with the development of low- and moderate-
cost housing where it is needed. Norman Williams, Jr. & Thomas Norman, Ex-
clusionary Land Use Control: The Case of North Eastern New Jersey, 22 SYRA.-
CUSE L. REV. 475, 478 (1971). A list of types of exclusionary zoning may be
instructive.
The arsenal of tools for the process of exclusion is steadily growing.
Lower percentage land occupancy-larger minimum plots-minimum
house sizes-complicated building codes-limiting number of building
permits issued per year-non look-alike clauses (including a recent
New Jersey ordinance against interior look-alikes)-costlier road spec-
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ing to the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG), the
regional Council of Governments'1 for the San Francisco Bay
Area, "1]and use controls.., usually create the most signifi-
cant housing constraints in a city or county."' 2 The ameliora-
tion of exclusionary land use controls is essential to the crea-
tion of affordable housing opportunities.13
Local governments in California have a legal obligation
to help meet their region's housing needs by enacting land
use ordinances conducive to the development of the locality's
fair share of the affordable housing needed in the region.' 4
Nevertheless, some localities refuse to uphold this obligation,
retaining instead their exclusionary land use ordinances."i
The first part of this article evaluates current regional
housing statutes and the implementation of these statutes. 6
It examines the law pertaining to regional housing targets,
fair share housing targets for localities, and requirements of
localities vis-a-vis their fair share targets. It also describes
the mechanism for enforcing the fair share statutes.
ifications (for the sake of cost)-high permit fees-excessive develop-
ment speculations-rigid enforcement of regulations in hardship
cases-excessive bonding or cash deposit requirements-requirements
for completion of improvements prior to granting building permits-
refusal to accept bonds instead of cash-confiscation of park lands as
condition for subdivision approval ... installation of facilities far be-
yond the requirements of a subdivision to solve existing or anticipated
municipal problems-refusal to permit construction of sewage plants
where health authorities prohibit septic tanks-terroristic upzoning,
subsequent to the purchase of land by a developer-open threats of
reprisals if relief is sought in courts-ex post facto regulations-and a
veritable host of others.
WiLLAm D. VALENTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw 521 (3rd ed. 1987).
The impact of exclusionary zoning on housing costs is discussed thoroughly
in other commentaries. See, e.g., Alan Mallach, Exclusionary Zoning Litigation:
Setting the Record Straight, 9 REAL ESTATE L.J. 275 (1981). For a discussion on
the impact of exclusionary zoning on housing supply see Richard F. Muth, Com-
mentary on the Redistribution of Income Through Regulation in Housing, 32
EMORY L.J. 691 (1983).
11. A Council of Governments is "a single multi-county council created by a
joint powers agreement pursuant to Government Code Chapter 5, between cit-
ies and/or counties in the same region." CAL. GOVT. CODE § 65582(b) (Deering
1987 & Supp. 1993). Its purpose is to address issues of regional concern.
12. Local Housing Element Assistance Project, Blueprint for Bay Area
Housing, A HANDBOOK FOR ADDRESSING THE CRITICAL HOUSING SHORTAGE IN
THE BAY AREA 27 (May 1990) [hereinafter Local Housing].
13. See Mallach, supra note 10.
14. CAL. GOVT. CODE § 65583(c) (Deering 1987 & Supp. 1993).
15. See discussion infra part II.
16. See discussion infra part I.
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The second part of this article examines the extent of
noncompliance with the fair share housing statutes.17 It dis-
cusses past efforts to compel localities to meet their fair share
housing obligations, and it examines the effect of the fair
share statutes on local government housing policies.
The third part of the article evaluates the mechanism for
enforcing the fair share housing laws.' 8 The cornerstone of
the enforcement mechanism is a private right of action
against non-complying localities. Analysis of this enforce-
ment mechanism reveals significant shortcomings that arise
from its dependence on litigation and judicial intervention in
local land use decisions.
The fourth part of the article argues that the existing ju-
dicial enforcement mechanism should be replaced by an ad-
ministrative enforcement mechanism." It describes the ba-
sic attributes the new enforcement mechanism should have.
I. CURRENT FAIR SHARE HOUSING STATUTES
A. The Housing Element of the General Plan and Other
Requirements
California Government Code section 65300 requires
every locality to "adopt a comprehensive, long-term general
plan for the physical development of the county or city."20
The plan consists of "a statement of development policies...
diagrams and text setting forth objectives, principles, stan-
dards and plan proposals," and must include seven elements:
land use, circulation, housing, conservation, open space, noise
and safety. 21 "'The general plan is atop the hierarchy of local
government law regulating land use.' ' 22 Courts have analo-
gized it to "a constitution for all future developments." 23
Of the seven elements that state law requires in each lo-
cality's general plan, the housing element must meet the
most detailed specifications. The structure and function of a
housing element can be broken into six parts: review of the
17. See discussion infra part II.
18. See discussion infra part III.
19. See discussion infra part IV.
20. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 65302 (Deering 1987 & Supp. 1993).
21. Id.
22. Concerned Citizens of Calaveras County v. Board of Supervisors, 212
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previous housing element, existing and projected housing
needs assessment, resource inventory, governmental and
nongovernmental constraints on housing, quantified housing
objectives, and housing programs.24
The primary factor in a locality's housing needs assess-
ment for the future should be the Regional Housing Needs
Plan (RHNP), prepared by the regional Council of Govern-
ment (COG); each housing element must "include the local-
ity's share of the regional housing need in accordance with
section 65584," which mandates COG fair share targets.25
However, localities treat the fair share targets set by their
region's COG as advisory, because the statute does little to
punish localities that fail to incorporate fair share targets
and does not reward localities that comply with fair share
requirements.26
The section of the housing element that sets forth the lo-
cality's housing programs should identify specific sites to ac-
commodate housing needs for each household income level.
Legislation enacted in 1991 further requires that those sites
be zoned for densities that will permit the needed low-income
housing. 28 The legislation also requires development stan-
dards that will enable the development of affordable
housing.29
The statute does not restrict localities' freedom to under-
take housing programs of their own choosing. The regulatory
and land use techniques that localities may use to encourage
the development of housing on the designated sites include:
procedural reform to streamline the development approval
process, lower development standards, higher density, den-
sity bonuses, inclusionary zoning, office/housing linkage, re-
zoning vacant land, infill housing, mixed-use zoning, and
growth control exemptions.30 The statute states that housing
elements should be reviewed by the State Department of
Housing and Community Development (HCD) as frequently
as possible, but at least once every five years.3 1 HCD evalu-
24. CAL. GOVT. CODE § 65583 (Deering 1987 & Supp. 1993).
25. Id. § 65583(a)(1).
26. See infra discussion part III.
27. CAL. GOVT. CODE § 65583(c) (Deering 1987 & Supp. 1993).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Local Housing, supra note 12, at 37-60.
31. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 65588 (Deering 1987 & Supp. 1993).
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ates housing elements for compliance with basic statutory re-
quirements and for their effectiveness in attaining commu-
nity housing goals and objectives.32 HCD's housing element
review schedule sets deadlines for all first and second revi-
sions of housing elements. These deadlines have passed. 3
By now, all localities in California's metropolitan areas
should have adopted housing elements approved by HCD.
California Government Code section 65400 requires each
city's and county's planning agency to report annually to
HCD on the status of its general plan and on progress made
toward implementing the elements of the plan.34 HCD sug-
gests that localities demonstrate their progress by indicating
the number of housing units added in the reporting year and
the affordability of those units, and comparing the number of
units added to the locality's regional share objectives. 5
These reporting requirements are relatively new.3 6 Little in-
formation on the localities' progress toward regional housing
goals can be gleaned from the annual reports.
B. Regional Housing Needs Plan
HCD determines each COG's share of California's hous-
ing needs.3 7 Based on this allotment, COGs prepare Regional
Housing Needs Plans (RHNPs) for the localities within their
region. The RHNPs indicate existing housing needs as of
January 1, 1988, and projected housing needs through April
1, 1995.38 The evaluation of existing housing needs and the
projection of future housing needs take into account market
demand for housing, employment opportunities, availability
of suitable sites and public facilities, commuting patterns,
type and tenure of existing housing, loss of existing afforda-
ble housing, and housing needs of farm workers.3 9 The stat-
ute also requires that the distribution of regional housing
32. Id.
33. Id. § 65588(b).
34. Id. § 65588.5.
35. Memorandum from Nancy J. Javor, Chief, Division of Housing Policy
Development, to Interested Parties, 3-4 (Dec. 1990) (on file with author).
36. The reporting requirement was included in S.B. 1019, enacted in 1991.
CAL. GOVT. CODE § 65588.5 (Deering 1987 & Supp. 1993).
37. See CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 65584 (Deering 1987 & Supp. 1993).
38. Id. § 65588(a).
39. Id. § 65584.
[Vol. 34
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needs minimize the further concentration of low-income
housing in low-income areas.4 °
Housing needs are broken down by household income
into four categories: very low-income (below fifty-one percent
of median area income), low-income (fifty-one to eighty per-
cent of median area income), moderate-income (81-120 per-
cent of median area income), and above moderate-income
(above 120 percent of median area income).4 ' The COGs reg-
ularly consult with HCD as they develop their housing plans.
They also submit their draft RHNP for local comment and
conduct public hearings on the RHNP.42 Localities then pro-
pose revisions to the RHNP before it becomes final.43
The statute gives little guidance to COGs on how to de-
termine each locality's fair share of the region's housing
needs. The COGs design the methodology for calculating re-
gional housing needs.44 ABAG, the COG for the San Fran-
cisco Bay Area, determines each locality's existing housing
need by subtracting the number of units available for perma-
nent occupancy within the locality's jurisdiction from the
number of units that are needed to accommodate the house-
holds in the jurisdiction with a regional vacancy goal rate of
4.5 percent.45 The Southern California Association of Gov-
ernments (SCAG), the COG for the Los Angeles area, deter-
mines each locality's existing housing need by calculating the
number of low-income households (i.e., households with in-
comes of less than eighty percent of the area median house-
hold income) that pay more than thirty percent of their in-
come for housing.46 The number of low-income households
without housing are added, and the number of households re-
ceiving government housing subsidies are subtracted from
that figure.47 The existing housing need calculation for each






45. ASS'N OF BAY AREA GOV'TS, SAN FRANcisco BAY AREA HOUSING NEEDS
DETERMINATIONS 5 (1989).
46. SOUTHERN CAL. ASS'N OF GOV'TS, REVISED REGIONAL HOUSING NEEDS
ASSESSMENT III-1 (1988).
47. Id. at 111-2.
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cancy rate of two percent for single-family homes and five
percent for multi-family housing.48
Projected housing need equals the number of units neces-
sary to accommodate growth in each locality. The growth fac-
tor takes into account market demand for housing, projected
job growth, availability of sites, commuting patterns, type
and tenure of housing, and housing needs of farm workers.4 9
ABAG estimates that each Bay Area locality's future fair
share equals the average of projected housing need for that
locality, its county, and the region.50 Each locality has sepa-
rate fair share targets for each of the four household income
categories. 5 ' SCAG uses a different approach to determine
fair share targets. It starts with a goal of achieving a fair
share distribution of the housing it projects will be needed in
twenty years.52 It then works backward incrementally from
each locality's twenty-year fair share target.53 The housing
targets for each five years move one-fourth of the way toward
a regional distribution of housing adequate for all income
levels.54 SCAG identifies "impacted areas" (i.e., areas that
host a high concentration of very low- and low-income hous-
ing) and adjusts housing targets for those areas in order to
avoid further concentrating low-income housing.55 The meth-
odology for determining existing and projected housing needs
varies from region to region.56
It is beyond the scope of this article to suggest how fair
share housing determinations could be improved. However,
the lack of uniformity among regions in determining locali-
ties' fair shares raises questions regarding the precision and
correctness of the various methodologies.5 7
48. Id.
49. AsS'N OF BAY AREA GOV TS, supra note 45, at 5.
50. Id.
51. CAL. GOVT. CODE § 65584(a) (Deering 1987 & Supp. 1993).





57. In recognition of the need for statewide reform, the 1993 Governor's
Growth Management Report proposed eliminating fair share allocations and
substituting "performance standards." GOvERNOR'S INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON
GROWTH MANAGEMENT, STRATEGIC GROWTH: TAKING CHARGE OF THE FUTURE 34
(1993). The Association of Bay Area Governments Regional Planning Subcom-
mittee on Restructuring the Housing Needs Process also advocated reform,
stating that "[tihe current housing needs determination process is ineffective,
[Vol. 34
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C. The Mechanism for Enforcing the Fair Share Housing
Statutes
Neither the state government nor the COGs have statu-
tory power to compel localities to meet their fair share hous-
ing targets. The law requires localities to take into account
fair share allocations,5 s but localities may reach different con-
clusions about their housing needs. HCD reviews of local
housing elements are purely advisory.59 HCD has no power
to compel localities to incorporate into their housing elements
the fair share targets set by the regional COG.6°
The housing element statute permits court action initi-
ated by a private party, not regulatory action by HCD or the
COGs.6 One remedy in a successful suit against a locality
that has failed to comply with the housing element statute is
injunctive relief under California Code of Civil Procedure sec-
tion 1085, which provides for a writ of mandate to compel a
city to meet its legal obligations.2 If a locality's general plan
is successfully challenged because of the inadequacy of the
housing element, the issuance of building permits, alteration
of zoning ordinances, and approval of subdivision maps are
per se inconsistent with the plan and therefore illegal. 3
Under California Government Code section 65755, the court
may suspend the locality's authority to:
1. issue building permits, or any category of building
permits, and all other related permits;
2. grant any and all categories of zoning changes, vari-
ances or both; and
3. grant subdivision map approvals for any and all cate-
gories of subdivision map approvals.64
Thus, the courts wield substantial power- to overrule local
land use powers.
inefficient and overly cumbersome." ABAG REGIONAL PLANNING SUBCOMMITTEE
ON RESTRUCTURING THE HOUSING NEEDS PROCESS, REFORM PROPOSAL 2 (1993).
58. CAL. GOVT. CODE § 65583(c)(1) (Deering 1987 & Supp. 1993).
59. Id. § 65583.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. § 65587(b).
63. Camp v. Mendocino County Bd. of Supervisors, 176 Cal. Rptr. 620, 632
n.10 (1981).
64. CAL. GOVT. CODE § 65755 (Deering 1987 & Supp. 1993).
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The courts have exercised their prerogative to suspend
the local land use powers in a number of cases.65 However,
recently, the Fourth District Court of Appeal indicated, in
dicta, that where a locality's housing element (or other ele-
ment of the general plan) is inadequate, California Govern-
ment Code sections 65753, 65754, and 65755 provide the ap-
propriate statutory remedy. 6 Section 65753 provides for an
expedited hearing schedule for housing element cases.6 7 Sec-
tion 65754 mandates court orders requiring compliance
within 120 days where a locality's housing element is found
to be out of compliance.6 In Garat, the court stated that
these provisions serve as the primary judicial remedies in
cases of local noncompliance, and that invalidating the local-
ity's general plan would have been inappropriate. 69
II. THE EXTENT OF NONCOMPLIANCE WITH FAIR SHARE
HOUSING LAws
A. Evidence of Noncompliance
A substantial number of California localities fail to com-
ply with statutory housing element requirements.7 0 In the
nine Bay Area counties, only 14 of 106 local governments
adopted a valid housing element by the July 1992 statutory
deadline.7 ' Of the final housing elements HCD has received
and reviewed, only thirty percent complied with state stan-
65. Camp, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 632 n.10; Buena Vista Gardens v. City of San
Diego, 220 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1985); Kings County Farm Bureau v. City of Han-
ford, 270 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1990); Warner Ridge Assocs. v. City of Los Angeles, 3
Cal. Rptr. 2d 306 (1991).
66. Garat v. City of Riverside, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 531-32 (1991).
67. CAL. GOvT. CODE § 65753 (Deering 1987 & Supp. 1993).
68. Id. § 65754.
69. Garat, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 531-32.
70. Id. A separate but related compliance problem concerns localities
where the housing element conflicts with local land use policies. Id. This prob-
lem presents some different obstacles than litigation over the adequacy of a
housing element. If the locality is a charter city, there is an insurmountable
obstacle: The zoning and other enactments of a charter city do not have to be
consistent with the city's general plan unless the city adopts the consistency
requirement. Id. at 281. See also Mira Dev. Corp. v. San Diego, 252 Cal. Rptr.
825 (1988). The perverse effect of this statutory interpretation is to allow char-
ter cities to undermine the fair share housing laws through conflicting land use
policies once they have adopted valid general plans. There is no statistical evi-
dence of the frequency of cases in which local land use ordinances conflict with
a locality's housing element. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to
address the inconsistency problem, it is important to bear this problem in mind.
71. See Bay Area Council, supra note 5.
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dards.7 2 Forty-four percent of the final adopted housing ele-
ments did not comply, and twenty-six percent were
obsolete.73
In light of prevalent noncompliance with the housing ele-
ment law, it is not surprising that localities are not meeting
their fair share targets. The failure to meet fair share targets
most severely impacts the lower end of the housing market.
In 1985, it was estimated that 600,000 low-income units
would be needed by 1990.7 4 Only sixteen percent, or 97,424,
of the needed units were built.75 Twenty-four percent of Cali-
fornia localities did not produce a single low-income housing
unit during the five-year period from July 1987 to July
1992.76 Although localities appear to have been more suc-
cessful in generating moderate-cost housing development,77
there remains a substantial gap between median home prices
and the incomes of first-time home buyers. 78 The inadequacy
of local efforts to meet their fair share targets raises the ques-
tion of whether the fair share housing statutes discourage lo-
cal exclusionary land use practices at all.
B. Fair Share Housing Statutes Have Little or No Affect
on Local Land Use Policies
Some localities comply with the fair share housing stat-
utes, but probably not because of the prospect of an enforce-
ment action.79 There is only weak evidence that the legisla-
72. California Planning and Development Report, Localities Fall Far Short
of State Housing Goals, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1, 5 (April 1990) (on file with the author)
[hereinafter California Planning].
73. Id. These figures do not include the housing elements that have not
been submitted to HCD, and that therefore missed the statutory deadline for
submission.
74. CALIFORNIA COALITION FOR RURAL HOUSING, LOCAL PROGRESS IN MEET-
ING THE Low INCOME HOuSING CHALLENGE: A SURVEY OF CALIFORNIA COMMUNI-
TIES Low INCOME HOUSING PRODUCTION 4 (1989) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA
COALITION].
75. Id. at 1, 3.
76. Id. at 1.
77. Id.
78. In 1990, the median price for a single family detached home in the Bay
Area was approximately $245,000. BAY VISION, supra note 8, at 8. Fewer than
15 percent of first-time home buyers could afford this price. Id.
79. Localities where a large number of affordable housing units are being
built are four times more likely to have a valid housing element than localities
where no affordable housing is being built. See California Planning, supra note
72, at 5. However, 60 percent of the localities with a commitment to the con-
struction of affordable housing do not have valid housing elements. Id.
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tion creating regional housing targets and strengthening the
housing element requirements is generating more affordable
housing. 0 Localities that encourage the construction of a
substantial number of affordable housing units are four times
more likely to have a housing element in compliance with
state law than localities that host no new affordable hous-
ing.81 However, sixty percent of the localities found to have a
major commitment to affordable housing lack housing ele-
ments that meet state standards.8 2 Currently, the primary
impetus for the development of affordable housing comes
from the localities themselves, not from the COGs or the
state.8 3 Statistical evidence indicates that the fair share
targets play, at best, a minor role in localities' housing
policies.84
The connection between fair share legislation and afford-
able housing production is especially tenuous toward the
lower end of the housing market. Of the twenty-eight coun-
ties that exceeded their overall residential construction
needs, only two - Plumas and Colusa - exceeded their low-
income housing construction needs.8 5 Plumas and Colusa
counties are rural and bear responsibility for a very small
proportion of statewide housing need.8 ' In absolute terms,
these counties made a very small contribution toward meet-
ing state low-income housing needs.8 7 The state's major pop-
ulation centers produced a fraction of their low-income needs:
Los Angeles County produced the highest proportion with
thirty-three percent. 8 Fresno County produced only five per-
cent of its low-income housing need through the housing ele-
ment cycle that ended December 31, 1989.89 In most coun-
ties, the difference between the percentage of low-income






85. See CALipoaRuN COALITION, supra note 74, at 7.
86. Id.
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cant.90 No urban county produced as high a percentage of its
low-income housing need as its overall housing need.91
III. EVALUATION OF THE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM FOR
FAIR SHARE HOUSING LAWS
Understanding the underlying reasons for the failure of
the fair share housing enforcement mechanism is essential to
determine a solution to the problem. The cornerstone of the
enforcement mechanism is a private right of action against
non-complying localities. 92 HCD and the COGs play only ad-
visory roles and have no enforcement powers.93 The fair
share housing laws are not enforced without litigation.
The deficiency of the enforcement mechanism for fair
share housing laws could stem from four possible sources: (1)
a lack of adequate judicial enforcement powers; (2) the disin-
clination of litigants to challenge non-complying localities; (3)
the reluctance of courts to use their enforcement powers; and
(4) the courts' incapacity to adequately enforce the statute.
This section shows that courts have adequate enforcement
powers, but that they rarely have the opportunity to use
them because of obstacles and disincentives to litigation.
9 4
Moreover, when courts have the opportunity to enforce the
fair share statutes, they are reluctant to intervene in local
land use decisions.95 This reluctance may derive from their
incapacity to adequately enforce the statute.9 6 Even if the
courts were not reluctant to enforce the statute, they would
remain unable to do so.
97
A. Judicial Enforcement Does Not Fail for Lack of
Enforcement Power
The courts wield substantial power to compel local com-
pliance with the fair share housing statutes. Under Califor-
nia Civil Procedure Code Section 1085 and Government Code
Section 65755, the courts may penalize non-complying locali-
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. CAL. GOVT. CODE § 65583 (Deering 1987 & Supp. 1993).
93. See supra part I.C.
94. See infra part III.D.
95. See infra part III.C.
96. See infra part III.D.
97. See infra part III.D.
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ties by suspending their land use powers.98 In the few cases
where a court has used this injunctive power against a non-
complying locality, the localities have responded by bringing
themselves into compliance. 99 The extent of noncompliance
does not reflect a deficiency in enforcement powers.
The suspension of land use powers would dramatically
affect any locality because of the importance of those powers
to local government and the frequency with which those pow-
ers are exercised. 10 0 The suspension of a locality's authority
to issue building permits, grant zoning variances, and ap-
prove subdivision maps would have a dramatic impact on all
commercial and residential development in the non-comply-
ing locality.101 These enforcement powers are sufficiently co-
ercive to force local compliance. 10 2
The suspension of a locality's land use powers would pre-
vent powerful local interests from moving ahead with plans
to build and renovate. Although suspension of land use pow-
ers would ultimately affect the entire non-complying locality,
the penalties would impact most those land owners who want
to develop, improve, or change the use of their property. 10 3
This group of landowners is a politically powerful constitu-
ency.10 4 Moreover, local government may stand to benefit
98. See infra part I.C.
99. See, e.g., Camp v. Mendocino County Bd. of Supervisors, 176 Cal. Rptr.
620 (1981); Buena Vista Gardens v. City of San Diego, 220 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1985)
(these cases resulted in injunctions against Mendocino County and the City of
San Diego suspending their land use powers pending the adoption of valid
housing elements). Both Mendocino County and the City of San Diego adopted
valid housing elements in response to the injunctions. Department of Housing
and Community Development, Summary of Current Housing Element Activity
(October, 1993) (on file with author).
100. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Gov-
ernment Law, 90 COLUM. LAw REV., 1, 3 (1990) (arguing that land use control is
the most important local regulatory power).
101. Id.
102. Id. Coerciveness is not, however, the only criterion for enforcement
powers. The burden of penalties against noncomplying localities should not fall
on those in need of affordable housing. This group has already been injured by
the locality's noncompliance with the fair share statutes. Further burdening
this group would, in a perverse way, reward the noncomplying locality. The
burden of the penalty should be borne by the people or institutions with the
power to bring the locality into compliance.
103. See, e.g., Buena Vista, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 734 (superior court issues writ
of mandate to set aside the San Diego City Council's approval of a development
permit for two developers). See also infra note 110, interview with Michael
Rawson.
104. See FRANK POPPER, THE POLrrIcs OF LAND-USE REFORM 63 (1981).
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significantly from increased tax revenue from the desired de-
velopment. Thus, the burden of the penalty falls on a group
capable of exerting substantial pressure for compliance.
Recent litigation against the City of Alameda revealed
the political dynamics that result when a locality faces the
threat of a court order suspending its land use authority.10 5
In Guyton v. City of Alameda,10 6 two low-income Alameda
residents claimed that the planning element (called the Com-
bined Land Use Plan, or CLUP) of Alameda's general plan
conflicted with state law requiring elements of the general
plan to "comprise an integrated, internally consistent and
compatible statement of policies .... o Alameda's policy,
embodied in the CLUP and a local ballot measure, Measure
A, which Alameda voters passed, limited the allowable
number of subsidized low- and moderate-income housing
units in Alameda to the percentage of such units in other San
Francisco East Bay Area cities.' 08 The complaint in Guyton
argued that the CLUP, and Measure A, rendered compliance
with the housing element law impossible. 10 9 The plaintiffs
sought and obtained a court order suspending Alameda's land
use powers. 10
The effect of the court order on Alameda demonstrates
the efficacy of judicial enforcement powers. Those who
wanted land use changes for their property in Alameda con-
tinued to request them from the city, but, after the court or-
der, they were told that the city could no longer grant the
requests."' The court order had a pervasive effect not only
on developers but also on homeowners who wanted to sub-
stantially remodel their homes, widen their driveways, or
105. Guyton v. City of Alameda, No. 646480-8 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda
County, filed Jan 9, 1989) (complaint filed by Michael Rawson for the Legal Aid
Society of Alameda County).
106. Id.
107. Id. See also CAL. GovT. CODE § 65300.5 (Deering 1987 & Supp. 1993).
108. Alameda, Calif Growth Control Challenge Settled with Agreement to
Provide Housing, 18 Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) No. 6, at 97-98 (June 25, 1990).
109. Guyton v. City of Alameda, No. 646480-8 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda
County, filed Jan 9, 1989).
110. Information about the Guyton case was obtained in interview with
Michael Rawson, Staff Attorney, Legal Aid Society of Alameda County. See also
Kathleen Kirkwood, Judge Gives City 120-Day Housing Element Extension, AL-
AMEDA J., July 28, 1989, at 3 (discussing suspension of Alameda's power to
grant building permits).
111. See Kirkwood, supra note 110.
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make other improvements that required city approval. 112
Displeasure with the city government grew, and ultimately
Alameda moved to comply with the fair share housing stat-
utes.1 3 Nine months after the court order, Alameda adopted
a housing element that satisfied the plaintiffs, and the judge
lifted the order suspending land use powers. 1 14 Guyton
shows that forcing local government to accept the political
onus for noncompliance is a powerful means of compelling
compliance." 5 A court order suspending local land use pow-
ers can induce local compliance because local governments
and their constituents have a strong interest in maintaining
local control of land use decisions. Local noncompliance does
not result from a lack of judicial enforcement power.
B. Why They Do Not Sue: Obstacles to Litigation
Despite the sweeping powers available to California
judges who find localities out of compliance with the fair
share statutes, judicial enforcement of the law has not
brought about compliance." 6 Nor has the mere existence of
judicial powers to suspend local land use authority deterred
noncompliance." 7 The unlikelihood of enforcement results
from obstacles to litigation that are inherent in the existing
scheme of judicial enforcement.
Low- and moderate-income people and developers of low-
and moderate-income housing are potential litigants against
noncomplying localities, because they stand to gain most di-
rectly from the enforcement of the fair share housing laws."'
Each group faces different obstacles to litigation. The rules
governing standing do not create a significant impediment to
112. See generally id.
113. Karen Matthews, By Making Loophole in Law, Alameda May Have
Saved It, ALAMEDA TIMES STAR, Apr. 26, 1990, at 2.
114. Id.
115. Steve Massey, Lawsuits a Tool for Building Homes: Low-cost Housing
Advocates Suing Cities, SAN FRANcisco CHRON., June 18, 1990, at A8.
116. See discussion supra part II.
117. See discussion supra part II.
118. Most of the housing that would be developed if localities were forced to
comply with the fair share housing laws would be affordable for low- and mod-
erate-income families. CALIFORNIA COALITION, supra note 74, at Appendix G.
Upper-income housing development in California actually exceeded regional
housing needs. Id.
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litigation."l 9 For low- and moderate-income people, legal
costs are the greatest obstacle to litigation. 120 The expense of
litigation is prohibitive for moderate-income people, and
there is no organization that represents their interests in the
enforcement of the fair share housing laws.' 2 ' Moderate-in-
come people do not have access to free legal services. 122
Moreover, they are unlikely to organize in support of a class
action suit against a locality. 123
Low-income people are forced to depend on limited legal
services. Legal Aid offices have been the only ones to take on
these cases for low-income people. 124 However, Legal Aid at-
torneys are primarily occupied with urgent cases that have
119. Any tax-paying citizen of a noncomplying locality has standing. CAL.
CIV. PRO. CODE § 526(a) (Deering 1991). See also Blair v. Pitchess, 96 Cal. Rptr.
42, 48 (1971). Citizen plaintiffs probably do not even need to demonstrate that
they would be personally damaged by the locality's failure to meet its legal obli-
gations. See Green v. Obledo, 172 Cal. Rptr. 206, 217 (1981). The causal rela-
tion between a city's actions and a developer's hardship gives the developer
standing. Stocks v. City of Irvine, 170 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1981).
120. Private attorneys can file fair share housing suits on behalf of taxpayers
and collect attorney's fees. See CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROC. § 1021.5 (Deering
1991). However, there are no published cases in which this has occurred.
121. There are only three published fair share housing cases brought by citi-
zens' groups. See Camp v. Mendocino County Bd. of Supervisors, 176 Cal. Rptr.
620 (1981); Buena Vista Gardens v. City of San Diego, 220 Cal. Rptr. 732
(1985); Garat v. City of Riverside, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504 (1991) (citizens joined by
development consortiums).
122. It is the purpose of Legal Aid offices to serve the legal needs of those
least able to afford legal assistance. 45 C.F.R. § 1611.1 app. A. Each Legal Aid
office establishes a maximum income level for its clients. Id. That income level
cannot exceed 125% of the official Federal Poverty Guidelines, adjusted for fam-
ily size. Id. § 1611.3. The income limit is $14,463 for a family of three and
$17,438 for a family of four. Id. § 1611.
123. A full discussion of the reasons for the failure of moderate-income fami-
lies to organize in support of fair share housing litigation is beyond the scope of
this article. However, one reason may be that many families that stand to ben-
efit from the development of affordable housing in a locality live outside that
locality. See John Landis, Do Growth Controls Work?, C.P.S Brief, Feb. 1992, at
5 (describing recent growth trends in California). They are a diffuse group that
has no voice in the locality's land use decision-making. Id. Moreover, moder-
ate-income families living in noncomplying localities have historically sought
affordable housing elsewhere rather than sue the localities for noncompliance.
Id.
124. Based on interviews with Michael Rawson, whose experience with fair
share housing litigation is discussed above, and John Huerta, who trains legal
aid attorneys on housing element litigation for the Western Center on Law and
Poverty, legal services offices have provided the only legal representation for
low-income people in fair share housing litigation. Telephone interview with
Michael Rawson, Staff Attorney with the Legal Aid Society of Alameda County
in the Guyton case, March 23, 1993. Telephone interview with John Huerta,
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an immediate and direct impact on the lives of low-income
people.12 The length of litigation and the development pro-
cess eliminate any prospect of quickly generating the devel-
opment of more affordable housing through the enforcement
of fair share statutes. 126 Moreover, low-income plaintiffs
might not benefit directly from the enforcement of fair share
housing laws because, even if enforcement does eventually
generate the development of affordable housing, they might
not live in that housing. 127 Because fair share housing litiga-
tion does not produce immediate results that have a direct
impact on low-income people, Legal Aid attorneys concen-
trate on other means of meeting their clients' affordable hous-
ing needs. 128
Housing developers treat the legal costs related to the de-
velopment of housing as a business expense and factor those
costs into the project's budget. Legal costs, like any other de-
velopment cost, may preclude development.' 29 Low-income-
housing developers in particular may not have the capital to
wage an extended legal battle before breaking ground on a
new project. 130
Even if legal costs are not prohibitive, housing develop-
ers are likely to be reluctant to wage legal battle against lo-
calities. If their litigation were successful and forced a local-
ity to alter its land use policies, without the locality's good
Staff Attorney with the Western Center on Law and Poverty, February 25,
1993.
125. The Legal Services Corporation employs a number of methods to dis-
courage impact litigation. The primary disincentive to impact litigation is the
mechanism for funding legal services offices, which rewards offices for maximiz-
ing the number of clients they serve directly. 45 C.F.R. §§ 1620.3, 1620.5 (re-
garding priorities in the allocation of resources). In addition, legal services at-
torneys must surmount certain procedural hurdles before filing class action law
suits. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 1617.3, 1605 (appeals).
126. Telephone interviews with Michael Rawson, Staff Attorney, Legal Aid
Society of Alameda County in the Guyton case, March 23, 1993, and John




129. See Jerry Harris, Comment, Rezoning-Should It Be A Legislative or
Judicial Function, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 409, 420 (1979); Briffault, supra note 100,
at 45.
130. See FRED BOSSELMAN AND DAVID CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN
LAND USE CONTROL 319 (1971) (explaining that developers of expensive housing
can more easily absorb the cost of land use regulations than developers of af-
fordable housing).
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will, other impediments to development might arise.131 De-
velopers are unwilling to sour a relationship with a locality
on which the developer depends for cooperation with ongoing
or future projects. 132
Finally, the time required for an extensive legal battle
may impede development. Instead of paying cash, developers
generally obtain financing for the acquisition of the land they
plan to develop.13 3 If the developer has an option on the site
for the proposed development, a delay caused by litigation
may force the developer to lose the option or spend more
money to extend the option.13 4 Commitments for private fi-
nancing for housing development do not wait for the resolu-
tion of litigation; they expire within a set period of time.1
3 5
Moreover, certain government low-income housing programs,
such as the low-income housing tax credit, must be used
within one year or they are lost. 136 Thus, litigation may dra-
matically alter the financing for a project by delaying it.
Obstacles to litigation preclude the comprehensive en-
forcement of the fair share laws through the courts. Judicial
enforcement actions can occur only in response to fair share
housing litigation.137 Therefore, obstacles to litigation render
judicial enforcement irregular and erratic. Lack of local com-
pliance that goes unnoticed by the courts is an inherent fea-
ture of the existing scheme of judicial enforcement.
131. See Briffault, supra note 100, at 45 n.182. One notorious exclusionary
zoning case was decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court six years after it
was filed. In Girsh v. Township of Nether Providence, 263 A.2d 395 (Pa. 1970),
the court ordered the Township of Nether Providence to make land available for
the development of multifamily housing. Id. In response, the Township re-
zoned a quarry for apartment development instead of rezoning the plaintiffs
property. Id. The plaintiff returned to court; unfortunately, by the time the
court finally granted an order directing the Township to issue a building permit
to the plaintiff, the plaintiff had died. Id.
132. See, e.g., Bradley Inman, Laws Have the Right Intent, But No Teeth,
SACRAMENTO BEE, December 8, 1991, at H4.
133. GRANT S. NELSON AND DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, Fi-
NANCE AND DEVELOPMENT, 887 (3d ed. 1987)
134. Id. at 891.
135. Id. at 890.
136. See 26 U.S.C.A. 42. A building does not qualify for low-income housing
tax credit unless it meets the tax credit requirement within the first year of the
credit period for the building. Id.
137. See discussion supra part I.C.
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C. Court Reluctance to Use Its Enforcement Powers
The dearth of fair share housing litigation conceals an
underlying problem. The courts are unwilling to evaluate the
substance of localities' housing elements. Instead, they limit
themselves to reviewing facial compliance with the housing
element law. Even if the obstacles to litigation were greatly
reduced, it is not likely the courts would adequately enforce
the fair share statutes.
The standard of review in cases concerning the adequacy
of a housing element demonstrates judicial aversion to deal-
ing with the substance of housing elements. Housing ele-
ments must be in "substantial compliance" with state law.138
The courts have said that "substantial compliance" means
"actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to
every reasonable objective of the statute, 'as distinguished
from mere technical imperfections of form.' " 39 However, this
language is somewhat misleading, because it suggests that
courts evaluate the substance of housing elements. The
courts do not evaluate the substance of housing elements to
see whether they meet the reasonable objectives of the stat-
ute. 14 0 Instead, the courts determine whether housing ele-
ments include the components set forth in the statute. 14 1 The
courts look only at the face of the housing elements, not at
their content.142 Thus, the court's test is really one of facial
compliance.
In Camp v. Mendocino County Board of Supervisors,143
the court enjoined Mendocino County from exercising certain
land use powers because the County lacked an adequate
housing element and other requirements for a valid general
plan.' 4 The County's housing element consisted of a pam-
phlet entitled The Housing Element of the General Plan, but
the pamphlet described itself as the initial housing ele-
138. Camp v. Mendocino County Bd. of Supervisors, 176 Cal. Rptr. 620, 629
(1981).
139. Id. See also Buena Vista Gardens v. City of San Diego, 220 Cal. Rptr.
732 (1985) (quoting Camp, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 629).
140. See generally Camp, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 620 and Buena Vista, 220 Cal.
Rptr. at 732.
141. See generally Camp, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 620 and Buena Vista, 220 Cal.
Rptr. at 732.
142. See generally Camp, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 620 and Buena Vista, 220 Cal.
Rptr. at 732.
143. 176 Cal. Rptr. 620 (1981).
144. Id.
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ment.145 The pamphlet amounted to little more than an in-
ventory of housing in the County, based on information that
was ten years old. 146 The housing element did not designate
adequate sites for housing development or make adequate
provisions for the housing needs of all economic segments of
the community, as required by law.' 47 On its face, Mendocino
County's housing element lacked the required components of
a housing element. 4" The Camp court did not test the rigor-
ousness of the "actual compliance" standard, because
Mendocino County's housing element was facially invalid.'
49
The court considered a challenge to a somewhat more
complete housing element in Buena Vista Garden Apartments
Association v. City of San Diego.' 50 In Buena Vista, the court
found that the City of San Diego's housing element met six of
seven statutory requirements, which the plaintiffs claimed
were lacking.15 ' However, the court's scrutiny of the housing
element did not exceed that necessary to determine whether
it facially complied with the statutory requirements. The
court doubted the adequacy of various parts of San Diego's
housing element, but nevertheless found them substantially
in compliance with the housing element statute. 52 For in-
stance, the court held that the housing element did not vio-
late the statute despite its failure to quantify the amount of
land available for assisted housing.'53 The statute states,
"[tihe housing element shall. consist of ... a statement of
goals, policies, quantified objectives and scheduled programs
for the preservation, improvement and development of hous-
ing. " 15 4 Although HCD criticized San Diego for not quanti-
fying the goals of its housing programs, and the court stated
that it was possibly "of the opinion City should adopt Depart-
ment's recommendations," the court acquiesced to the un-
145. Id. at 631.
146. Id.
147. Id. See also CAL. GOVT. CODE § 65302(c) (Deering 1987 & Supp. 1993).
148. Camp v. Mendocino County Bd. of Supervisors, 176 Cal. Rptr. 620, 629
(1981).
149. Id.
150. Buena Vista Gardens v. City of San Diego, 220 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1985).
151. Id. at 737-42.
152. Id. at 738-40, 741.
153. Id. at 741.
154. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 65583 (Deering 1987 & Supp. 1993).
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quantified description of San Diego housing programs. 155
"[Elven though a plan or its parts may not, from a court's sub-
jective point of view, be 'satisfactory' or 'suitable,' nonethe-
less, unless there is a statutory requirement on point, such
unsatisfactoriness or unsuitability may not form a basis for
concluding that the plan is legally inadequate." 5 6 The court
drew a distinction between a legally adequate housing ele-
ment and a housing element that is "'acceptable,' 'appropri-
ate,' 'satisfactory,' and 'suitable.' " 15 7 When put to the test in
Buena Vista, the "actual compliance" standard showed itself
to be no more than a facial validity requirement.
The standard of review for housing elements prior to
Camp and Buena Vista revealed the court's prevailing atti-
tude of reluctance to determine whether each challenged
housing element met the policy objectives of the statute.
Before Camp and Buena Vista, the court would not strike
down a housing element "[a]bsent a complete failure or at
least substantial failure on the part of a local governmental
agency to adopt a plan which approximates the Legislature's
expressed desires."'58 The court recognized that it is "ill-
equipped to determine whether the language used in a local
plan is 'adequate' to achieve the broad goals of the legisla-
ture."1 59 The court adopted a stricter standard of review in
response to the enactment of more detailed housing element
requirements. 6° However, the new legislative requirements
did not dispel the court's reluctance.
The advent of the stricter "actual compliance" standard
set forth in Camp and Buena Vista reflects the court's desire
to strengthen enforcement of the housing element statutes.
There remains, however, an underlying unwillingness to
delve beneath the surface of localities' housing elements. The
courts' ambivalence manifested itself in Buena Vista.
Although the court specifically "rejected the complete or sub-
stantial failure" standard, the only part of the housing ele-
155. Buena Vista Gardens v. City of San Diego, 220 Cal. Rptr. 732, 741
(1985).
156. Garat v. City of Riverside, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 525 (1991) (footnotes
omitted).
157. Id.
158. Bownds v. City of Glendale, 170 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (1981).
159. Id.
160. Buena Vista Gardens v. City of San Diego, 220 Cal. Rptr. 732, 740
(1985).
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ment that failed to pass court scrutiny did so because it did
not evidence any program to conserve affordable housing
stock, as required by the statute. 16 1 Applying the old stan-
dard and the new statutory requirements might well have
yielded the same result.
The unwillingness of the courts to go beneath the surface
of housing elements is apparent from their disinclination to
consider evidence extrinsic to the housing element itself. In
Camp, the court of appeals refused to consider the extrinsic
"findings of fact" on which the trial court had based its deter-
mination of compliance. 16 2 In Buena Vista, the court found
part of San Diego's housing element in substantial compli-
ance even though it would have been out of compliance but
for a specific reference to documents outside the general plan
that fulfilled statutory requirements. 16 3 However, "a defi-
cient element cannot be saved by consideration of documents
which are not relied upon in the discussion of that ele-
ment."1 64  Localities cannot use documents external to the
housing element to prove the legal adequacy of the housing
element if those documents are not mentioned in the locali-
ties' general plans. 6 5  Just as the courts refuse to look be-
hind the facial sufficiency of housing elements, they refuse to
entertain the question of whether extrinsic evidence saves a
housing element. 166  The courts avoid any question that
would require an analysis of the actual-as opposed to the
legal-adequacy of housing elements; the courts avoid sub-
stantive analysis of housing elements.
A source of judicial reluctance to intervene in fair share
housing disputes is the courts' conception of their role in local
land use decision-making. During the latter half of this cen-
tury, the courts generally deferred to localities' decisions on
local land use questions.
67
161. Id. at 744. See also CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65583 (Deering 1987 & Supp
1993).
162. Camp v. Mendocino County Bd. of Supervisors, 176 Cal. Rptr. 620, 622
(1981).
163. Buena Vista, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 744.
164. Kings County Farm Bureau v. Hanford, 270 Cal. Rptr. 650, 678 (1990).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. The courts have generally approved restrictive land use laws. For ex-
ample, the courts have consistently deferred to local judgment regarding mini-
mum lot requirements. In Clemons v. Los Angeles, 222 P.2d 939 (1950), the
California Supreme Court approved minimum lot size zoning requirements,
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[D]ecision making power in the area of land use planning
still rests with the local governmental agencies to be exer-
cised within the constraints prescribed by enactment's of
the state Legislature. When any attack is made upon the
exercise of that decision making power and the adequacy
of the general plan within which it is to be exercised, a
presumption of validity attaches to the actions of the local
governmental agency.16
The "scheme of law" pertaining to land use decision-making
promotes judicial deference to local control. 169 The objective
of this "scheme of law" is to ensure that decisions affecting
the growth of a community will take into account the "various
interrelated aspects of community life." 170 The role of the
courts within this "scheme of law" is one of detachment from
local decision-making and tolerance for its results. Thus, the
court's role constrains judicial intervention in local land use
decision-making. 171 More specifically, it precludes substan-
tive judicial analysis of housing elements.1 72
The courts look to the legislature and to the localities,
which exercise power delegated by the legislature, to decide
noting that smaller lots created slums. Id. In Morse v. County of San Luis
Obispo, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1974), the court of appeals approved a five-acre min-
imum lot zoning ordinance. Id. In Gisler v. County of Madera, 112 Cal. Rptr.
919 (1974), the court upheld an eighteen-acre minimum lot size requirement,
which may have been the largest minimum lot size permitted in the United
States. Id. See also ROBERT LiNowEs AND DON ALLENSWORTH, THE POLITICS OF
LAND USE LAw: PLANNING, ZONING AND THE PRIVATE DEVELOPER 111-15 (1976).
168. Bownds v. City of Glendale, 170 Cal. Rptr. 342, 348 (1981).
169. Building Industry v. Superior Court, 259 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1989). See also
California Government Code § 65580, which reads in part:
(d) Local and state governments have a responsibility to use the pow-
ers vested in them to facilitate the improvement and development of
housing to make adequate provision for the housing needs of all eco-
nomic segments of the community.
(e) The Legislature recognizes that in carrying out this responsibility,
each local government also has the responsibility to consider economic,
environmental, and fiscal factors and community goals set forth in the
general plan and to cooperate with other local governments and the
state in addressing regional housing needs.
CAL. GOVT. CODE § 65580 (Deering 1987 & Supp. 1993).
170. Bownds, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
171. See, e.g., id.; Yost v. Thomas, 205 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1984); City of Los
Angeles v. State, 187 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1982); See also Roger Cunningham, Re-
zoning By Amendment As An Administrative or Quasi-Judicial Act: The "New
Look" in Michigan Zoning, 73 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1349 (1974).
172. See John M. Payne, From the Courts, 12 REAL ESTATE L.J. 359 (1984)
(describing the prevalence of the traditional judicial role in Pennsylvania fair
share housing cases).
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between competing political rationales for land use deci-
sions.11 3 They seek "to maintain an appropriate distance and
dis-involvement from the legislative function of plan/ordi-
nance adoption and.., to refrain from making [perhaps un-
warranted] assumptions as to what should be invalidated
and what should not. .... ,,174 The courts consider the adop-
tion of housing elements by localities to be essentially a legis-
lative act.175 Substantive judicial analysis of localities' hous-
ing elements would invade the legislative function.1
7 6
Judicial deference to local land use decision-making
stems from the court's conviction that it:
[C]annot and should not involve itself in detailed analysis
of whether the elements of the [general] plan are ade-
quate to achieve its purpose. To do so would involve the
court in the writing of the plan. That issue is one for de-
termination by the political process and not by the judicial
process. 1
77
Substantive judicial analysis of localities' housing elements
would invade the legislative function, embroiling the court in
decisions that are essentially political. For example, the
housing element statute requires localities to identify and to
zone specific sites for affordable housing.178 However, deci-
sions regarding the zoning designations necessary to accom-
modate affordable housing are not made by applying a rule of
law. These decisions are shaped by a process involving input
from various parties in the community, each with their own
set of interests and preferences. 179 The courts seek to avoid
173. Thomas Mayo, Exclusionary Zoning, Remedies and the Expansive Role
of the Court in Public Law Litigation, 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 755, 780 (1980).
174. Garat v. City of Riverside, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 532, n.33 (Ct. App. 1991).
175. In the context of fair share housing cases, the New York Court of Ap-
peals has spoken to this point more forcefully than any other:
Zoning ... is essentially a legislative act. Thus, it is quite anomalous
that a court should be required to perform the tasks of a regional plan-
ner. To that end, we look to the Legislature to make appropriate
changes in order to foster the development of programs designed to
achieve sound regional planning.
Berenson v. Township of New Castle, 341 N.E.2d 236, 243 (N.Y. 1975). See also
Bownds v. City of Glendale, 170 Cal. Rptr. 342, 348 (Ct. App. 1981).
176. See Margaret M. Prahl, Comment, The Rezoning Dilemma: What May a
Court Do with an Invalid Zoning Classification, 25 S.D. L. REV. 116, 117
(1980).
177. Bownds, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
178. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 65583(c) (Deering 1987 & Supp. 1993).
179. LiNowEs & ALLENSWORTH, supra note 167, at 13-20.
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substituting their personal opinions regarding land use for
the local decision-making process.' 80
Local land use decision-making is a participatory pro-
cess. Parties interested in this process include: planning
boards; locally elected officials; planning staffs; developers;
homeowners associations; neighborhood groups; minority or-
ganizations; the business community; and transit, housing,
and redevelopment agencies. 18 ' Each participant in the deci-
sion-making process may have a different conception of the
community's interest-or even a different conception of the
community."12 In contrast to this participatory process, fair
share housing litigation focuses on a particular dispute be-
tween a locality and a plaintiff or definable class of plaintiffs.
The central question presented to the court in fair share
housing cases is whether the fair share housing laws require
a locality to treat a particular party differently.'i 3 The pro-
cess of litigation treats fair share housing cases as a contest
between two sides.18 4  However, judges recognize the mul-
tifaceted nature of local land use questions.18 5 The issues
raised by the plaintiffs in fair share litigation necessarily con-
cern a broader community whose interests are not repre-
sented in court. Courts are reluctant to bypass the political
process, which exists to provide a forum for community par-
ticipation in the land use decision-making process.
Although judges may want to provide relief for injured
parties, they limit themselves to ruling on the legal adequacy
of local actions, even while acknowledging the actual inade-
quacy of local policy.'8 6 A "court looks only to ensure the re-
quirements of [the fair share housing laws] are met and not
whether, in the court's judgment, the programs adopted are
adequate to meet their objectives or are the programs which
the court thinks ought to be there."'87 Courts outside Califor-
180. See, e.g, Payne, supra note 172, at 28; Prahl, supra note 176, at 117-18;
Michael S. Holman, Comment, Zoning Amendment - The Product of Judicial
or Quasi Judicial Action, 33 OHIO STATE L.J. 130, 136-39 (1977).
181. See LINOWES & ALLENSWORTH, supra note 167, at 12-20.
182. Id.
183. Briffault, supra note 100, at 45.
184. See RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 168 (1966).
185. See id.
186. See, e.g., Buena Vista Gardens v. City of San Diego, 220 Cal. Rptr. 732
(Ct. App. 1985). See also, Prahl, supra note 176 (discussing the court's dilemma
of providing adequate relief without invading legislative domain).
187. Buena Vista Gardens, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 741-42.
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nia that have taken a more interventionist and activist ap-
proach to land use cases are criticized for acting arbitrarily
and without a set standard of review. 1 8  The California
courts have avoided this charge by deferring to localities on
the substance of housing elements and limiting themselves to
reviews of facial compliance.' 8 9 The California courts recog-
nize the political nature of local land use decision-making. 190
Fair share housing cases raise issues that the political pro-
cess must resolve, and litigation does not permit the neces-
sary political discourse.191 Consequently, the courts acqui-
esce to a detached role from local land use decision-making
and are reluctant to impose remedies. 192
D. Lack of Court Capacity: The New Jersey Experience
Court scrutiny of housing elements is minimal not
merely because of court reluctance to intervene, but because
courts lack the capacity to engage in more comprehensive and
probing evaluations of local policies. Because local land use
decisions, including implementation of the fair share housing
statutes, are guided primarily by political and policy consid-
erations, these decisions do not lend themselves to judicial re-
view. 193 Moreover, the courts lack the technical expertise in
planning, the time, and the personnel to adequately enforce
the fair share housing statutes. 94 Designing a housing ele-
ment requires the collection and analysis of information on
housing market conditions, land availability, existing zoning
patterns, population growth and income, infrastructure ca-
pacity, and other data.195 Familiarity with sites, building
standards, community character, and finance is necessary in
order to assess the feasibility of affordable housing at a par-
188. See Cunningham, supra note 171, at 1349. See also Roger Cunning-
ham, Reflections on Stare Decisis in Michigan: The Rise and Fall of the "Rezon-
ing as Administrative Act" Doctrine, 75 MIcH. L. REV. 983 (1977).
189. See supra notes 168-169.
190. Bownds v. City of Glendale, 170 Cal. Rptr. 342, 345 (1981).
191. Id. See also Yost v. Thomas, 205 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1984) and City of Los
Angeles v. State, 187 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1982).
192. Bownds, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
193. See, e.g., LINOWES & ALLENSWORTH, supra note 167; BABCOCK, supra
note 184, at 168; Payne, supra note 172, at 28; Mayo, supra note 173, at 780.
194. Rosalind Mytelka & Arnold Mytelka, Exclusionary Zoning: A Consider-
ation of Remedies, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1975). See also Note, Zoning for
Regional Welfare, 89 YALE L.J. 748, 762-63 (1980).
195. See CAL. GOVT. CODE § 65583 (Deering 1987 & Supp. 1993).
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ticular location. 9 ' Judges may lack this familiarity.197 Un-
like local land use decision-makers, courts do not have the
advice and assistance of staff planners, economists, demogra-
phers, and civil engineers. 198 Because of their lack of profes-
sional staff, the courts are also ill-equipped to monitor local
compliance after they have rendered a decision. 99 Some
commentators argue that the courts are too slow and inflexi-
ble to adapt to the changing demands of land use decision-
making.200 The courts' incapacity to enforce the fair share
housing statutes underlies all other defects in the existing en-
forcement scheme.
The record of judicial action on fair share housing cases
in California is, perhaps, insufficient evidence of the lack of
judicial capacity. The extent of noncompliance suggests the
magnitude of the task of enforcing the law, and the language
of the courts suggests judicial awareness of the courts' inade-
quacy for the task.20 1 However, there has not been enough
fair share litigation to test the capacity of California courts to
decide these matters.
The state with the most experience handling fair share
housing litigation is New Jersey.20 2 In 1972, a group of low-
income blacks and Hispanics sued the Township of Mount
Laurel, New Jersey on the grounds that its land use ordi-
nances unlawfully excluded low- and moderate-income fami-
lies.20 3 The plaintiffs claimed Mount Laurel had violated
state statutes prohibiting localities that had not provided
their fair share of low- and moderate-income housing from
preventing the development of low- and moderate-income
housing.2 4 According to the plaintiffs, Mount Laurel enacted
zoning ordinances so restrictive in minimum lot area, lot
196. See generally Mayo, supra note 173, at 777.
197. See id. at 760.
198. See id. at 777.
199. See id.
200. See Payne, supra note 172, at 27-28.
201. See, e.g., discussion supra part III.C.
202. Supreme courts in four states-California, Pennsylvania, New York
and New Jersey-have undertaken significant review of local exclusionary zon-
ing. With the exception of the New Jersey Supreme Court, these courts did not
alter local control over land use and did not mandate effective oversight by the
state. See Briffault, supra note 100, at 43.
203. See generally Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) [hereinaf-
ter Mount Laurel I].
204. Id. at 716.
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frontage, and building size requirements that they prevented
the development of low- and moderate-income housing.2 °5
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a developing
municipality "cannot foreclose the opportunity... for low and
moderate-income housing and . . .its regulations must af-
firmatively afford that opportunity, at least to the extent of
the municipality's fair share of the present and prospective
regional need therefore."2 °6 When a developing municipal-
ity's restrictive land use regulations prevent the development
of low- and moderate-income housing, those regulations vio-
late substantive due process and equal protection under the
New Jersey State Constitution.20 Although the New Jersey
Court found a much greater local obligation to facilitate the
development of low- and moderate-income housing, 20 basic
similarities between the New Jersey and California fair share
housing cases exist. Both the New Jersey and the California
courts were called on to enforce fair share housing laws.20 9 In
both states, the enforcement of those laws demanded court
intervention in local land use decisions.210 In both states, the
courts intervened by mandating certain local actions,
although they did so to different degrees.
Mount Laurel and its progeny211 tested the ability of
courts to enforce fair share housing laws. The New Jersey
Supreme Court's commitment to enforcing the Mount Laurel
doctrine cannot be questioned. The court went out of its way
to rule against Mount Laurel's development ordinance even
though the ordinance had been repealed.21 2 The Mount Lau-
rel doctrine generated a number of lawsuits against localities
205. Id. at 719.
206. Id. at 724.
207. Id. at 728.
208. See generally Mt. Laurel I.
209. See generally Buena Vista Gardens v. City of San Diego, 220 Cal. Rptr.
732, 740 (1985) and infra note 211.
210. See generally Buena Vista, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 740 and infra note 211.
211. There are three Mount Laurel cases: Mount Laurel I is Southern Bur-
lington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.) cert.
denied 423 U.S. 808 (1975) [hereinafter Mount Laurel 1]; Mount Laurel II is
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d
390 (N.J. 1983) [hereinafter Mount Laurel III; and Mount Laurel III is Hills
Dev. Co. v. Township of Bernard, 510 A.3d 621 (N.J. 1986) [hereinafter Mount
Laurel II1].
212. Mount Laurel 1, 336 A.2d at 729 (court held that questions raised by the
ordinance were not moot because of its "importance generally" and because the
ordinance could be re-enacted).
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for failure to meet their fair share obligations.2 13 In 1983, the
New Jersey Supreme Court revisited the issue of noncompli-
ance with the Mount Laurel doctrine. 214 The Mount Laurel II
court recognized the continuing pervasiveness of noncompli-
ance, but voiced its determination to make the doctrine
work.21 5 The court's previous efforts to enforce the Mount
Laurel doctrine had not induced local compliance. The court
concluded:
Ten years after the trial court's initial order invalidating
[Mount Laurel's] zoning ordinance, Mount Laurel remains
afflicted with a blatantly exclusionary ordinance.
Papered over with studies, rationalized by hired experts,
the ordinance at its core is true to nothing but Mount Lau-
rel's determination to exclude the poor.216
In addition to exemplifying widespread noncompliance in
New Jersey, the Mount Laurel case became infamous. 217
Municipalities disregarded the Supreme Court's decision. 218
In response, the appellate court reluctantly set forth guide-
lines for calculating fair share housing, removing local re-
strictions and exactions, and providing incentives for the con-
struction of low- and moderate-income housing.21 9
The court recognized that the problem of noncompliance
was better left to the legislature. 220 However, the Mount
Laurel II court felt compelled to expand its role in the en-
forcement of fair share housing laws.22 ' In the absence of ex-
ecutive or legislative action to satisfy the constitutional obli-
gation underlying the Mount Laurel doctrine, the court
believed it had no choice but to enforce the obligation itself.222
The Mount Laurel II court optimistically assessed its
ability to enforce the fair share requirements:
213. Mount Laurel II was actually the consolidation of six cases against mu-
nicipalities for violating the Mount Laurel doctrine. Mount Laurel 11, 456 A.2d
at 410, n.1.
214. Id. at 390.
215. Id. "This Court is more firmly committed to the original Mount Laurel
doctrine than ever, and we are determined, within appropriate judicial bounds,
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We hope that individualized case management, the con-
stant growth of expertise on the part of the judges in han-
dling these matters, the simplification and elimination of
issues resulting from our rulings and from the active in-
volvement of judges early in the litigation, and the re-
quirement that, generally, the matter be disposed of at
the trial level in its entirely before any appeal is allowed,
will result in an example of trial efficiency that needs
copying, not explaining.223
However, the judicial system was poorly equipped to handle
the demands of enforcing fair share requirements. In the
third and final Mount Laurel case in 1986, the court recog-
nized the "total disregard by municipalities of the judiciary's
attempts to enforce the [fair share] obligation."224
Judicial enforcement of the Mount Laurel doctrine failed
because the courts lacked the essential capacity to assist each
locality in crafting zoning ordinances tailored to the locality
and in compliance with fair share requirements.225 The
judges lacked the time, the staff, and the necessary technical
expertise in planning to bring each locality in New Jersey
into compliance with the statute.226 The New Jersey
Supreme Court recognized its limitations and mandated the
appointment by trial judges of special masters to assist the
parties in negotiating the requirements under the fair share
laws.227 Essential enforcement efforts were to occur outside
of the courtroom, under the direction of special masters.228
Judges, by themselves, would have been unable to determine
specific requirements for individual localities, much less pro-
vide detailed advice on compliance.
The courtroom proved to be a poor forum for the resolu-
tion of noncompliance issues. If fair share housing litigation
is inherently costly, time-consuming, and inefficient as an in-
strument of enforcement, then it is additionally wasteful be-
cause judgment against a locality only means a further en-
forcement process.
223. Id. at 459.
224. Mount Laurel III, 510 A.3d 621, 642 (N.J. 1986).
225. Id. at 634 (citing Mount Laurel 11, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983)).
226. Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 440-41.
227. Id. at 435-54 (Special master's compensation was to be paid entirely by
the municipality, and was due upon final judgment).
228. Id.
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The waste of judicial energy involved at every level is sub-
stantial and is matched only by the often needless expen-
diture of talent on the part of lawyers and experts. The
length and complexity of trials is often outrageous, and
the expense of litigation is so high that a real question
develops whether the municipality can afford to defend or
the plaintiffs can afford to sue.22
Mount Laurel and its progeny suggested that an administra-
tive agency capable of mediating fair share disputes would be
better equipped to enforce fair share requirements.
Ultimately the New Jersey Legislature responded to the
Mount Laurel decisions by enacting the Fair Housing Act (the
Act), which established an administrative framework for the
enforcement of fair share housing requirements. 230 The Act
created the Council on Affordable Housing (the Council),
which has the power to define housing regions, determine
regional low- and moderate- income housing needs, and es-
tablish criteria for local fair share determinations. 23 1 The
Council does not initiate actions against noncomplying locali-
ties.232 It handles the cases that were pending in court and
also the cases of any additional localities that voluntarily
seek certification.2 3  A locality initiates Council review by
submitting a Resolution of Participation.234 The transfer of a
locality's case to the Council is treated the same way as a
Resolution of Participation. 3 5 In both cases, the Council
prepares a submission schedule for the locality, setting forth
deadlines for draft and final housing elements and fair share
plans.236
The Act mandates a mediation process for the resolution
of disputes between the Council and localities that disagree
with the Council's determination of their fair share require-
229. Id. at 410.
230. Fair Housing Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 1985, ch. 222, §§ 1-34, 52 N.J.S.A.
27D-301 (amended 1993).
231. Id. § 7, 52 N.J.S.A. 27D-307.
232. Id.
233. Id. § 16, 52 N.J.S.A. 27D-316. See also NEW JERSEY COUNCIL ON AF-
FORDABLE HOUSING (COAH), REQUIREMENTS OF A HOUSING ELEMENT AND FAIR
SHARE PLAN 3 (1988).
234. COAH, PROCEDURAL RULES: RESOLUTIONS OF PARTICIPATION (1986).
235. Id.
236. Id. at Subchapter 3.
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ments.237 If mediation does not produce a resolution, an ad-
ministrative law judge handles the dispute.238 After receiv-
ing the judge's recommendation, the Council makes the final
determinations regarding certification.239
Certification benefits localities by protecting them from
litigation. Litigants against a locality that has obtained cer-
tification from the Council must meet a heightened burden of
proof; they must prove noncompliance by clear and convinc-
ing evidence.24 ° In addition, plaintiffs must join the Council
as an adverse party.24 1
There is insufficient evidence to determine whether the
New Jersey approach will bring about compliance in most lo-
calities. The Council has been in full operation since July
1986.242 One hundred and thirty-six municipalities were cer-
tified by the Council as of September 1992.243
The court in Mount Laurel III lauded the Act for estab-
lishing a regulatory system that obviates most lawsuits: "[i]f
the Council conscientiously performs its duties ... a success-
ful Mount Laurel lawsuit should be a rarity."244 A locality
that receives the Council's certification can be virtually cer-
tain that it is safe from legal challenge. The establishment of
the Council and the transfer of the fair share cases from the
courts to the Council enabled the courts to withdraw from the
field of enforcement. The court's activism provoked criticism
throughout the state,24 5 and the court was eager to shed its
responsibility for enforcing fair share requirements.246 The
237. Fair Housing Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 1985, ch. 222, §§ 15, 52 N.J.S.A.
27D-315 (amended 1993).
238. Id. § 15(c), 52 N.J.S.A. 27D-315(c).
239. Id.
240. Id. § 17, 52 N.J.S.A. 27D-317.
241. Id. § 17(c), 52 N.J.S.A. 27D-317(c).
242. COUNCIL ON AFFORDABLE HOUSING, COUNCIL ON AFFORDABLE HOUSING
NEWSLETTER (1987).
243. COUNCIL ON AFFORDABLE HOUSING, STATUS OF MUNICIPALITIES (1992).
244. Mount Laurel III, 510 A.3d 621, 639 (N.J. 1986).
245. Governor Kean publicly denounced Mount Laurel II and rescinded the
state planning documents the court used in rendering its decision. RICHARD F.
BABCOCK & CHARLES L. SIEMAN, THE ZONING GAME REVISITED, 221-31 (1985).
Numerous local elections attacked the decision. In a non-binding state referen-
dum, New Jersey voted to abolish the decision. Briffault, supra note 100, at 53-
54. See also Housing the Poor in Suburbia: Vision Lags in New Jersey, NEW
YORK TIMES, June 1, 1987, at B1.
246. In Mount Laurel III, the court stated, "[i]nstead of depending on
chance-the chance that a builder will sue-the location and extent of lower
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court's commitment to the Mount Laurel doctrine ultimately
gave rise to the court's support for an administrative enforce-
ment scheme.247 The court recognized that an administrative
mechanism would have a greater capacity to enforce the fair
share laws.248
IV. A NEW ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM FOR THE FAIR
SHARE HOUSING STATUTES
A. The Need for a New Enforcement Mechanism
The conspicuous failure of the fair share housing laws to
generate the construction of affordable housing is drawing at-
tention to the defects in those laws. There are several propos-
als to reform the processes for determining fair share and lo-
cal compliance with the fair share laws.249 Unfortunately,
current proposals for reform treat enforcement of the fair
share housing laws as a tangential issue.250 The proposed re-
forms might facilitate enforcement simply by lowering the
standards for compliance so that noncompliance becomes less
common, but even then, enforcement problems would
remain.25 '
Fair share determinations could be made fairer, and the
goals of the fair share laws could be made easier for localities
income housing will depend on sound, comprehensive statewide planning, de-
veloped by the Council." Mount Laurel III, 510 A.3d at 632.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Several coalitions, organizations, and government offices have begun
work on proposals to reform the fair share housing laws. Written recommenda-
tions for reform include: SB 929, introduced in 1992 by state Senator Prestley;
ABAG REGIONAL PLANNING SUBCOMMIrEE ON RESTRUCTURING THE HOUSING
NEEDS PROCESS, REFORM PROPOSAL (1993); GOvERNOR'S INTERAGENCY COUNCIL
ON GROWTH MANAGEMENT, STRATEGIC GROWTH: TAKING CHARGE OF THE FUTURE
34 (1993).
250. Id.
251. Both the 1993 Governor's Growth Management Report and the ABAG
Regional Planning Subcommittee on Restructuring the Housing Needs Process
proposed a reduced emphasis on the housing element and an increased empha-
sis on performance in promoting housing. The ABAG Subcommittee recom-
mended rewarding localities that "perform well" by exempting them from HCD
certification. ABAG REGIONAL PLANNING SUBCOMMITTEE ON RESTRUCTURING
THE HOUSING NEEDS PROCESS, REFORM PROPOSAL (1993). The Governor's report
argues that "[i]ntegration, together with clear housing performance standards
backed by meaningful financial incentives for implementation, could eliminate
the need for a separate, isolated housing element process." GOVERNOR'S INTER-
AGENCY COUNCIL ON GROWTH MANAGEMENT, STRATEGIC GROWTH: TAKING
CHARGE OF THE FUTURE 34 (1993).
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to attain, but questions regarding local compliance cannot be
avoided. As long as localities play the dominant role in land
use decision-making, they will exercise discretion in choosing
sites for the development of fair share housing and in modify-
ing land use ordinances to accommodate that development.
If, for instance, a locality's fair share of the region's projected
housing need for low-income families is 100 units, the local
land use decision-making process will determine where that
housing should be located and what land use ordinances are
necessary to make the housing feasible. The locality may, for
example, designate in its housing element a fifty-acre site for
the development of low-income housing. Alternatively, the
locality may choose to locate the low-income housing on
smaller, "scattered" sites. The locality would also specify in
its housing element changes to the land use ordinances for
the designated site or sites, which, according to the locality,
would permit the development of the desired housing. The
locality may reduce frontage requirements, increase height
restrictions, or make some other modification to the land use
ordinances for the designated site or sites. No formula or
legal rule can specify the sites each locality must designate
for fair share housing or dictate how each locality must mod-
ify its land use ordinances to promote the desired
development.
The fair share laws restrict local decision-making lati-
tude regarding compliance with the fair share require-
ments.2 52 However, within the parameters of the fair share
laws, there exists an arena of decision-making animated by
local politics. 253 Inevitably, some decisions made in this
political arena will seek to skirt fair share requirements.
Amendments to the fair share laws will not preclude conflicts
between local political interests and regional and state inter-
ests unless those amendments end local control over land use
decision-making. Since local control over land use exempli-
fies tenets deeply embedded in our legal system, it is all but
certain that reforming the fair share laws will not eliminate
the need for an enforcement system to fairly adjudicate ques-
tions regarding local compliance with those laws.
252. See discussion supra part L.A.
253. Briffault, supra note 100, at 43.
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B. What a New Enforcement Mechanism Would Look Like
The courts have failed to comprehensively and effectively
enforce the fair share statutes.254 Obstacles to litigation di-
minish the number of fair share housing cases to a small per-
centage of all the cases where noncompliance occurs.255 The
inherent lack of a comprehensive scheme for judicial enforce-
ment is aggravated by the courts' unwillingness and inability
to adequately enforce the statutes in the cases they do adjudi-
cate.256 However, the conclusion that the courts are incapa-
ble of comprehensively and effectively enforcing the fair
share housing statutes is not an ending point, but a starting
point.
A new mechanism for the enforcement of the fair share
housing statutes is needed. The new enforcement mecha-
nism should deal comprehensively with the noncompliance
problem and not let obstacles to litigation narrow its effect.
To achieve this goal, the new enforcement mechanism should
have the capacity - which the courts currently lack - to
promote, negotiate, and ultimately compel compliance on a
case-by-case basis. In other words, the new enforcement
mechanism should have both a more widespread and a more
individualized effect on localities.
The procedure for action against non-complying localities
would be divided into three stages: the advice and negotiated
agreement stage, the administrative dispute resolution stage,
and the appeal stage.
1. The Advice and Negotiation Stage
The purpose of the new enforcement mechanism would
not be to coerce, but rather to engender cooperation. In the
advice and negotiation stage, a regional or state agency
would assist localities in designing housing elements that
comply with fair share housing statutes and that address lo-
cal concerns. 257 After detailed discussions with the regional
254. See discussion supra part II.
255. See discussion supra part III.B.
256. See discussion supra parts III.C and III.D.
257. Although this article does not attempt to identify the entities that
would perform the advice and negotiation and administrative dispute resolu-
tion functions, a brief discussion of the considerations involved in choosing
these entities is valuable. State agencies, such as HCD, and regional agencies,
such as the COGs, both present distinct advantages and disadvantages. A re-
gional agency would be more accessible to localities. Its decisions might more
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or state agency, each locality would submit its housing ele-
ment to the agency for approval. The agency would approve
the housing element or indicate its reasons for denying ap-
proval. Localities would respond to the agency's review
either by incorporating proposed changes to their housing el-
ement or by explaining their reasons for not doing so. If, after
a set period of time, the agency determined that negotiations
with a locality were no longer progressing toward a valid
housing element, the agency would request administrative
dispute resolution. Localities that failed to submit housing
elements for review would also be referred to the dispute res-
olution stage of enforcement.
2. The Administrative Dispute Resolution Stage
Disputes that are not resolved during the advice and ne-
gotiation stage would be aired at a hearing before a neutral,
fact-finding, dispute resolution agency. The regional or state
agency that advised the localities would present evidence
supporting its determination of noncompliance, chronicle the
localities' efforts to meet their fair share obligation, if any
such efforts were made, indicate where those efforts fell
short, and report their findings regarding the requirements
for localities' housing elements. The localities would be noti-
fied and their presence at the hearings requested. Represent-
atives of the localities would be entitled to present the locali-
ties' cases at the hearings.2 58 ' The dispute resolution agency
closely reflect local desires and might be more attuned to local needs. On the
other hand, regional administration might be overly susceptible to local influ-
ences, particularly the influence of the dominant localities in the region. Local
influence over a regional agency could cause excessive parochialism, particu-
larly if the regional agency represented each of the localities in its jurisdiction,
as is the case with the COGs. Finally, regional administration could result in
the balkanization of the enforcement process in the state, with each region im-
plementing different enforcement policies. Enforcement by a state agency
presents the problem of reducing local participation in, and control over, land
use decisions. A state agency might be less sympathetic to local desires but
more mindful of statewide needs. On the other hand, a state agency's distance
from local politics would not preclude the possibility of politicization at the state
level. The competing needs for local influence over enforcement and non-paro-
chial, standardized enforcement must be balanced. The determination of which
agency or agencies enforce the fair share housing laws is, therefore, critical.
258. At least one commentator has expressed concern that non-judicial hear-
ings of the sort described here might not meet due process requirements. See
generally, Holman, supra note 180. However, there is no reason that an admin-
istrative hearing on local compliance with the fair share statutes could not meet
due process requirements. Although an advantage of a new administrative en-
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would determine whether localities had complied with the
fair share housing statutes on the basis of evidence
presented. If the localities had not complied with the stat-
utes, the dispute resolution agency would issue an order
mandating compliance. These orders would instruct locali-
ties to fulfill the requirements for compliance set forth during
the advice and negotiation stage, or some modification of
those requirements. The dispute resolution agency would as-
sess penalties for continued noncompliance, including any of
the forms of injunctive relief the courts can currently impose.
The dispute resolution agency could also suspend non-com-
plying localities' land use powers.
The dispute resolution hearings would also provide a fo-
rum for input from other interested parties.259 Moreover,
those in disagreement with the compliance measures agreed
upon by a locality and the state or regional advisory agency
could petition for dispute resolution. However, as an incen-
tive for local compliance, approval of a locality's housing ele-
ment at the advice and negotiation stage would create a pre-
sumption of compliance with the fair share statutes.
3. The Appeal Stage
In the third stage, localities could appeal arbitration de-
cisions to the court of appeals. 260 The court of appeals would
apply the same facial validity standard it uses currently, but
it would apply the standard to decisions mandating require-
forcement scheme might be its streamlined procedure, this procedure would
have to meet state and federal due process standards. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAw 202-10 (2d ed. 1984). If the procedure did not pass constitu-
tional muster, then disputes over local housing activities would end up in court,
negating the advantage of the administrative scheme.
The basic due process requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard
could be incorporated in the administrative agency's hearings on local noncom-
pliance. The issues raised at these hearings, the scope of discovery, and the
actions taken pursuant to adjudication could be limited so as to expedite the
resolution of disputes without undermining due process. Presumptions favor-
ing HCD determinations would not violate due process standards. Mt. Laurel
III, 510 A.3d 621, 632-34 (N.J. 1986). Localities would retain their right to ap-
peal administrative decisions to the courts, though their likelihood of success
would be reduced.
259. An important function of this hearing would be to create a record that
could be used by the courts on appeal.
260. Findings of fact made during the dispute resolution stage would elimi-
nate the necessity of a factual inquiry by the Superior Court. See BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 202-10 (2d ed. 1984). See also Mt. Laurel III,
510 A.3d 621, 632 (N.J. 1986).
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ments for compliance. Unless dispute resolution required a
locality to take an action which, on its face, violated the fair
share statutes, the dispute resolution would stand. Localities
could also challenge the validity of the dispute resolution pro-
cess. Any flaw in the proceedings that violated due process
requirements and prejudiced the locality's case would be
grounds for new dispute resolution. Under no circumstances
would the courts be called upon to conduct a substantive
analysis of local land use policies. Their standard of review
for cases involving alleged noncompliance with the fair share
housing laws would not change. However, under the new en-
forcement scheme, the minimal level of judicial scrutiny ap-
plied in fair share housing cases would favor an administra-
tive determination of substantive compliance, instead of
facial compliance. The presumption favoring the dispute res-
olution would discourage localities from appealing to the
courts.
Those in disagreement with the determination of local
compliance at the dispute resolution stage could petition the
court of appeals to hear their complaints. However, as an in-
centive for local compliance and a disincentive to litigation,
an approval of a locality's housing element at the dispute res-
olution stage would create a presumption of compliance with
the fair share statutes. The party appealing from dispute
resolution approval of a locality's housing element would bear
the burden of showing that the housing element was facially
invalid. Only then would the court remand the case for new
dispute resolution. The approval of a locality's housing ele-
ment would serve the same function as the certification New
Jersey municipalities receive from the Council on Affordable
Housing.261 The New Jersey experience shows that some lo-
calities voluntarily seek certification of their compliance with
fair share laws in order to protect themselves from litiga-
tion.262 The approval of a locality's housing element by the
dispute resolution agency would protect the locality from fair
share litigation, creating an added incentive for local
compliance.
261. See discussion supra part III.D.
262. Id.
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B. The New Enforcement Mechanism Would Lack the
Flaws of the Existing Enforcement System
The new enforcement mechanism would address the
three root causes of the failure of the existing enforcement
system: (1) the disinclination of litigants to challenge non-
complying localities; (2) the reluctance of courts to use their
enforcement powers; and (3) the courts' incapacity to ade-
quately enforce the fair share housing statutes.
1. The Disinclination to Litigate
The new enforcement mechanism would circumvent ob-
stacles to litigation that reduce the amount of fair share
housing litigation and that consequently prevent the courts
from comprehensively enforcing the fair share housing stat-
utes. Instead of depending on litigants to exercise their pri-
vate right of action against noncomplying localities, the new
enforcement mechanism would work pro-actively with locali-
ties to promote compliance. During the advice and negotia-
tion stage, a regional or state agency would assist localities in
designing housing elements that met the fair share require-
ments and that took into account local concerns.
The new enforcement mechanism would emphasize con-
sultation and compromise at the advice and negotiation stage
of enforcement. The risk of being penalized for noncompli-
ance at the dispute resolution stage would create a strong in-
centive for localities to resolve disputes during the advice and
negotiation stage. The power of the dispute resolution agency
to suspend local land use decision-making would discourage
local intransigence. The prospect for obtaining a reversal of a
dispute resolution by appealing to the court of appeals would
be slight because of the strong presumption favoring dispute
resolution.
The new enforcement mechanism would also encourage
compliance by protecting localities deemed to be complying
with the fair share housing laws from lawsuits alleging non-
compliance. The approval of a locality's housing element by
the dispute resolution agency would create a strong presump-
tion in the locality's favor. The new enforcement mechanism
would not foreclose the opportunity to exercise the private
right of action against non-complying localities; litigants who
were dissatisfied with a locality's efforts to comply with the
fair share housing laws could request dispute resolution and
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ultimately appeal to the courts. However, administrative en-
forcement of the statutes would preclude most litigation.
2. Court Reluctance to Enforce the Statute
The new enforcement mechanism would avert the prob-
lem of judicial reluctance to enforce the fair share housing
statutes. Disputes remaining after the administrative en-
forcement process would require only a low level of scrutiny.
The presumptions favoring dispute resolution would shield
the courts from the land use questions they have attempted
to avoid. The courts would maintain their traditional dis-
tance from local land use decisions.
Unlike the existing system of judicial enforcement, the
new enforcement mechanism would accommodate the par-
ticipatory nature of land use decision-making. Assistance to
localities during the advice and negotiation stage would not
decrease local involvement in designing housing elements.
Local governments would continue to play the central role in
land use decision-making. Moreover, the regional or state
agency responsible for advising localities would not be imper-
vious to local political pressure. In the case of COGs, local
political pressure would have a strong influence, since COG
members are generally elected officials from the localities.
During the dispute resolution stage of enforcement, there
would still be opportunities for local participation, since the
resolution of disputes would consider input from interested
parties. Those not satisfied with local efforts to meet the fair
share requirements could request dispute resolution even if
the regional or state agency responsible for advising the local-
ity did not seek dispute resolution. The new enforcement
mechanism would open the process of generating local com-
pliance with the fair share housing statutes to a larger part of
the affected community.
3. Lack of Court Enforcement Capacity
By shifting enforcement responsibilities, the new en-
forcement mechanism would eliminate the problem of the
courts' lack of capacity. Regional and state agencies, such as
the COGs and HCD, currently have staff with planning ex-
pertise. The COGs and HCD would, however, require addi-
tional staff and funding before assuming enforcement respon-
sibilities. One objection to the new enforcement mechanism
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would be the cost of creating the necessary enforcement ca-
pacity in the agencies charged with enforcement.
C. Concern About Cost
Evaluating the cost of the new enforcement mechanism
is a complex and speculative undertaking. This article does
not presume that the costs of administrative or judicial en-
forcement can be accurately estimated, much less that the
author is capable of estimating them. However, it is possible
to delineate some of the costs. Although potential enforce-
ment agencies-the COGs and HCD-already exist, there
would certainly be an additional expense to giving those
agencies increased enforcement responsibilities. There
would also be an added cost to localities of designing valid
housing elements. To the extent that localities comply with
the fair share statutes without COG assistance, this cost
would reduce the cost of COG oversight.
The costs of administrative enforcement must be evalu-
ated keeping in mind all the costs of the existing enforcement
scheme.263 To those who would charge that administrative
enforcement is unjustifiably expensive, it should be pointed
out that judicial enforcement constitutes a substantial sub-
sidy for litigation.264 Moreover, the cost of the proposed ad-
ministrative enforcement scheme would have to be weighed
against the cost of exclusionary zoning. The cost of exclusion-
ary zoning is difficult to assess and varies by locality. How-
ever, many commentators agree that exclusionary zoning
(some would say all zoning) substantially increases the cost
and decreases the construction of affordable housing.265 Any
estimate of the cost of exclusionary zoning must also reflect
the impediments to regional planning it creates. The devel-
opment of affordable housing near jobs is a central goal of
regional planning.266 To the extent that exclusionary zoning
impedes the development of affordable housing near jobs, the
cost of exclusionary zoning must reflect the numerous traffic,
environmental, and other regional problems to which exclu-
263. BABCOCK, supra note 184, at 172 (arguing that administrative enforce-
ment may be cheaper than judicial enforcement).
264. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 93, 97 n.46 (1989) (discuss-
ing court costs as a subsidy for litigation in the context of contract disputes).
265. See Muth, supra note 10.
266. BAY VISION, supra note 8, at 3.
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sionary zoning contributes. Any calculation of the cost of ad-
ministrative enforcement must take into account the savings
realized through the reduction of exclusionary zoning.
Administrative enforcement would spread enforcement
costs. Instead of forcing plaintiffs to bear part of the cost, the
state would fund enforcement actions. The current system of
judicial enforcement places the financial burden of enforce-
ment on those who are unable or unwilling to sue noncomply-
ing localities.267 Moreover, the existing enforcement mecha-
nism places the financial burden of enforcement on those who
have already been injured by exclusionary zoning, and it at-
tempts to achieve the policy goals of the statute through court
action that potential plaintiffs are disinclined to initiate.
IV. CONCLUSION
Land use decisions have not traditionally been the prov-
ince of the judiciary.268 However, recent commentators on lit-
igation challenging exclusionary land use controls argue that
enforcement problems should be addressed primarily through
the courts. 269 This view has not always been so prevalent.
The proposal to reform land use by creating an administra-
tive agency to review the decisions of local authorities is not
new. 270
Local control over land use has shown itself to be deeply
embedded in the Constitution and our legal system.271 There
has been a trend during the last twenty to thirty years to-
ward growth control, stronger local general planning, and
home rule.272 Even advocates for state and regional land use
controls have come to admit that local government has been
the engine of progress in planning.273 Nevertheless, much of
267. See discussion supra part III.B.
268. See Holman, supra note 180 (containing a brief, but well documented,
history of legislative pre-eminence in the field of zoning).
269. Mayo, supra note 173, at 755. See also Prahl, supra note 176; Harris,
supra note 129; Mytelka, supra note 194.
270. See BABCOCK, supra note 184, at 154. See also FRED BOSSELMAN &
DAVID CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1971); Williams
& Norman, supra note 10.
271. Briffault, supra note 100, at 112.
272. David Callies, The Quiet Revolution Revisited, 46 J. Am. PLANNING
ASS'N, 135, 142 (1980).
273. It is interesting to compare the following two passages. In 1971, David
Callies and Fred Bosselman wrote, "[t]his country is in the midst of a revolution
in the way we regulate the use of our land .... The ancien regime being over-
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the past criticism of local land use control remains valid to-
day, and it is echoed here.
California has a strong tradition of highly restrictive lo-
cal land use laws.274 Although these laws serve some con-
structive purposes, they also contribute to the shortage of af-
fordable housing and other closely related problems. There is
not a single person living in a metropolitan region of Califor-
nia who does not suffer from the shortage of affordable hous-
ing. Aside from the high cost of housing, which results from
the shortage in supply, many workers are forced to commute
long distances to their jobs.275 The results are congested
roads, increased air pollution, and wasted time. California's
fair share housing statutes are intended to help address
these complex, interrelated problems.
Ample evidence shows that the fair share housing stat-
utes are not effectively enforced.276 Litigation has shown it-
self to be a poor enforcement tool. 277 Although the courts
have substantial enforcement powers, they are reluctant to
enforce the fair share housing statutes. Moreover, they lack
the staff and expertise to do so. New Jersey's experience pro-
vides some indication of how an administrative scheme might
improve enforcement.
The primary function of administrative enforcement of
the fair share statutes should be to assist localities in comply-
ing with the law. An administrative scheme need not sub-
sume traditionally local land use powers. However, where a
locality employs its land use powers to constrain the develop-
ment of affordable housing, those powers should be sus-
pended. The symmetry of this enforcement scheme has a cer-
thrown is the feudal system under which the entire pattern of land develop-
ment has been controlled by thousands of individual local governments, each
seeking to maximize its tax base and minimize its social problems, and caring
less what happens to others." BOSSELMAN & CALLIES, supra note 270, at 1. In
1980, Callies wrote, "[iut is probably more accurate to characterize the 'ancient
regime' of local land use controls as having metamorphosed rather than having
been overthrown." Callies, supra note 272, at 142.
274. A prime example of restrictive land use laws in California are local ordi-
nances that set minimum lot sizes. A number of these ordinances have been
challenged in court. See, e.g., Clemons v. Los Angeles, 222 P.2d 439 (1950);
Gisler v. County of Madera, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1974). See also LINOWES &
ALLENSWORTH, supra note 167, at 111-15.
275. See supra text accompanying note 7.
276. See discussion supra part II.
277. See discussion supra part III.
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tain strength. Local government would be prevented from
exercising land use powers unless it used those powers to
help meet regional housing needs.

